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Abstract  
 
A common approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand 
from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the 
merger case are differentiated along several dimensions, the resulting diversion ratios may 
be very different from those based upon market shares. This again may affect the predicted 
post-merger price effects. This article shows how merger simulation can be improved by 
using observed diversion ratios. To illustrate the effects of this approach we use diversion 
ratios from a local grocery market in Norway. In this case diversions from the acquired to 
the acquiring stores were considerably smaller than suggested by market shares, and the 
predicted average price increase from the acquisition was 40 % lower using this model 
rather than a model based upon market shares. This analysis also suggests that even a subset 
of observed diversion ratios may significantly change the prediction from a merger 
simulation based upon market shares.  
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1. Introduction 
Merger simulation attempts to estimate the price effects of horizontal mergers in 
oligopolistic markets. Recently there has been a considerable growth in the use of merger 
simulation models in cases investigated by antitrust authorities.1 The common approach 
when doing merger simulations, is to calibrate demand from market shares. Market shares 
can be poor predictors of substitution between products. The diversion ratio – how large 
fraction of customers leaving product A that would buy product B – are useful in defining 
the closest substitutes and therefore in measuring how closely products or firms compete. 
Thus, since diversion ratios comprise more information about substitutability than market 
shares, we propose to calibrate demand from observed diversion ratios. 
Although this approach has not been used in merger simulations, diversion ratios 
have been accepted as an important input to define relevant markets.2 They have been 
widely used in merger cases, for example by competition authorities in the UK on mergers 
between retail stores.3 The authorities were skeptical to the traditional method of counting 
the number of stores within isochrones, as differentiation between various types of stores is 
not captured. Instead of relying on market shares – or simply the number of rivals – a 
survey to reveal diversion ratios was conducted. A natural next step would be to use this 
information also to estimate the price increase following the merger. This is in line with the 
approach proposed in the new horizontal merger guidelines in the US.4 Of course, in a 
                                                 
1 Walker (2005) and Budzinski and Rohmer (2009) describe the use of merger simulation models.  
2 O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003) reformulated the critical loss analysis for defining the relevant market to 
employ diversion ratios rather than price elasticities. See also Katz and Shapiro (2003). 
3 The first merger where diversion ratios were used by the Competition Commission was Somerfield’s 
acquisition of Morrison’s 115 grocery stores in 2005. See Walters (2007) and Reynolds and Walters (2008) 
for a description of more recent merger cases in the UK where this method was used. 
4 The guideline states: ‘The Agency rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the level of the 
HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated goods. Where sufficient data are 
available, the Agencies may construct economic models designed to quantify the unilateral price effects 
resulting from the merger’ (US 2010, page. 21.) Note that HHI is an index that is calculated from market 
shares.  
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merger case a simulation should be supplemented by a broader analysis of among other 
things the prospects for entry and repositioning of products.   
 The diversion ratio is an intuitive measure of how the pricing of one product is 
constrained by another product and may be helpful in situations where own- and cross-price 
elasticities are unavailable. Note, however, that the diversion ratio informs us about the 
customers’ second choice, not about the reduction in demand following a price increase. 
Diversion ratios as such are thus suitable for revealing which products are close substitutes, 
but less suitable for predicting the price increase following a merger. Shapiro (1996) 
combined the diversion ratio and the price elasticity of market demand into a formula for 
predicting the price increase following a merger. His formula is derived from a symmetric 
duopoly model with single-product firms, and it has been used by competition authorities in 
the UK to estimate what they have characterized as an ‘illustrative price increase’.  
 Most markets, however, are characterized by asymmetries both in demand and costs, 
and single- as well as multi-product firms. In such cases simple formulas are unavailable 
and the evaluation of an exact, but complex formula may come close to performing a full 
merger simulation. Constructing a merger simulation model involves three steps: 
Establishing a demand system, specifying the mode of producer behavior and calibrating 
marginal costs. We are concerned with establishing a demand system. 
There are two approaches to derive demand. The first approach is an econometric 
estimation where one exploits a large data set. This approach has been applied in, among 
others, Bordley (1993), Hausman et al. (1994), Nevo (2000), Pinkse and Slade (2004), 
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) and Ivaldi and Lörincz (2009). Although this method is the 
preferred one, in some cases there are time and resource constraints that make this approach 
inapplicable. This makes it natural to apply a second approach, which is to calibrate demand 
from a minimal data set – often only market shares, reference prices and a few elasticity 
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parameters.5 In such cases the popular approach has been to assume that diversion ratios are 
proportional to observed market shares. While this route provides a quick first prediction of 
a price increase, it may introduce serious biases. As pointed out by Willig (1991), 
inferences of the nature of competition from market shares are problematic if the products 
are differentiated by characteristics salient to consumers and when relevant products vary in 
their similarities to one another in regards to these characteristics. In markets with 
differentiated products he suggested collecting information beyond market shares.  
 Our approach to constructing a simulation model follows this idea. We calibrate 
demand from observed diversion ratios and assessed market price elasticities. This is a 
methodology that makes it possible to exploit information from a simple survey, an 
approach that is attractive when an econometric estimation is not feasible. To the best of our 
knowledge this routine is new. It involves formulations also employed by econometricians 
– after all the common focus is on establishing a demand system – but in spirit our routine 
differs. We calibrate partial price elasticities from observations of diversion ratios, whereby 
all elasticities get the right signs; econometricians let their larger data set speak, but often 
constrain parameters in order to obtain correct signs.  
To illustrate the applicability of this approach, we analyze an acquisition in a local 
grocery market in Norway, where we have pairs of diversion ratios between eight stores.6 
These diversion ratios differ significantly from those that would follow from the assumption 
of diversion ratios being proportional to market shares. We argue that a combination of 
                                                 
5Werden and Froeb (1994) and Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002) employ calibration. See Werden and Froeb 
(2008) for a survey of the literature on merger simulations and Budzinsky and Ruhmer (2009) for a discussion 
of the role of such models in competition policy cases. 
6 In August 2007 Norway’s largest retail chain Norgesgruppen (NG) acquired the smaller chain Drageset. The 
acquisition raised anticompetitive concerns in several local markets and was notified to the Norwegian 
Competition Authority. Based on market shares the local market at Voss, a small village in the western part of 
Norway, was the most problematic. NG controlled four of the eight largest stores, while the acquired company 
had one. With the acquisition NG would increase its market share from less than 50 % to more than 60 %. The 
acquisition was cleared in an early phase. We do not take a stand on whether the clearance was correct or not; 
we just use this case to illustrate our approach. Note, however, that our merger simulation indicates that the 
anticompetitive effect of the merger is more limited than what follows from a traditional approach based on 
market shares.  
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location and the differences in product variety of the various stores can explain the observed 
diversion ratios better than what market shares are able to do. To check whether these 
observed differences matter for the price prediction from a merger simulation, we apply the 
model (denoted OBS) to the mentioned acquisition and compare its predictions with a 
model (denoted MS) where demand is based upon diversion ratios that are proportional to 
market shares. The predicted average price increase of the OBS model is 40 % lower than 
the prediction of the MS model. We think this difference is substantial and that it illustrates 
the need to go beyond market shares when assessing the anticompetitive effect of a merger 
in a differentiated products market. In this case, the lower prediction follows because the 
sum of observed diversion ratios from the acquired to the acquiring stores is much lower 
than predicted from market shares; 39% versus 54% respectively.  
 Due to time and resource constraints or for other reasons, one may have to rely on 
less detailed information than we got. We have investigated how price predictions would 
change if we only used a subset of this full information. It turns out that observed diversion 
ratios from two out of eight stores explain 2/3 of the gap in predictions, which suggests that 
even a subset of the (actual) diversion ratios may contribute significantly to improve the 
prediction from a merger simulation. 
 The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the local grocery market at 
Voss, Norway. In Section 3 a simulation model is calibrated from observed diversion ratios 
and market demand elasticities. In Section 4 this model is used to simulate the price effect 
following an acquisition, and these predictions are compared to the predictions from a 
merger simulation model based only on market shares. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. A local grocery market: An example of large asymmetries 
A grocery market is differentiated along several dimensions. Stores are located throughout 
the community leading to geographic differentiation. Some stores have a limited space and 
a low number of products while others have large space and a wider range of brands. This 
leads to differentiation in their offer, which we will call their product. Differentiation in 
space, product, and possibly other dimensions as well, may cause large asymmetries in 
diversion ratios that cannot be inferred from market shares.  
 To illustrate such asymmetries, we consider the local grocery market in the village 
Voss in the western part of Norway. Twelve stores were located reasonably close to each 
other, while there were long distances to stores elsewhere. In February 2008, after 
Norgesgruppen’s (NG) acquisition of Drageset was cleared by the Norwegian Competition 
Authority, Halleraker and Wiig (2008) made a survey among 800 shoppers.7, 8  They 
focused on the eight largest stores with a joint market share of more than 90 % of annual 
turnover.9 The market share of the largest store was approximately three times that of the 
smallest (of the eight). For our analysis, the most important question in the survey was 
which other store the shopper would have chosen if this store was unavailable, thus 
revealing his second choice. This information was aggregated to find the (revenue 
weighted) diversion ratios dji, i.e., how large fraction of diverted revenue from store i that 
would go to store j, j≠ i, if store i was not available. As a background for interpreting these 
numbers we present some data about location of stores in Voss and the answers from the 
sample of respondents.  
 
                                                 
7 Judged from the age profile the sample of respondents is representative for the population at Voss.  
8 Note that at the time of the enquiry NG had not yet changed the profile of the acquired store. Thus, the 
reported diversion ratios should provide good indications of the diversion ratios prior to the acquisition. 
9 At Voss Norgesgruppen controlled four stores (Meny, Spar, Kiwi Vangen and Kiwi Palmafossen), while 
Coop had two stores (Coop Mega and Coop Prix), and the ICA chain had the store Rimi. See also Table 1.  
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[Figure 1: Map with location of grocery stores at Voss] 
 
The eight stores fall into three geographical segments (Figure 1). Five stores are clustered in 
the centre of Voss. Drageset - the acquired store - and Coop Prix are located about four km 
to the north of the centre, while Kiwi Palmafossen is located about three km to the east.  
 
[Table 1: Descriptive statistics from the survey] 
 
Table 1 shows that the average bill per respondent is largest for Drageset, Meny, and 
Coop Mega, with Kiwi Vangen and Rimi at the lower end (Column 1). These latter two 
stores have the largest shares of customers saying price is important for their choice 
(Column 2), while Drageset, Meny, and Coop Mega have customers for whom price is 
reported to be of less importance; their customers say that product range is more important 
for their choice (Column 3). A picture emerges of stores falling into two groups: “Low-
price” (Kiwi Vangen, Kiwi Palmafossen, Rimi, and Coop Prix) and “Product range” (Coop 
Mega, Meny, and Drageset), with Spar in between and probably closer to the second group.  
Drageset and Meny have the lowest shares of Voss residents, 77.8 and 76.5 % 
respectively (Column 4). Few local customers mean more out-of-town customers. This 
interpretation is partially corroborated by respondents stating that their second choice is not 
among the other seven surveyed stores (Column 5). Meny and Coop Mega have somewhat 
larger diversions than the average to the outside of the surveyed market at Voss. These 
differences in what we call out-of-market diversion ratios may be caused by Voss being a 
(weekend) vacation resort for people from the nearby city of Bergen. Their second choice 
(to Meny or Coop Mega) may not be a low price store at Voss, but a store in Bergen with a 
larger assortment of brands.  
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Diversion ratios vary of course with differences in market shares. A firm with a 
larger market share will (on average) receive a larger share of firm i’s diverted revenue. Let 
Dji ≡ sj/(1-si) denote a diversion ratio from i to j that is proportional to firm j’s share sj. Our 
point is that observed diversion ratios dji are very different from Dji. Iji ≡ dji/Dji, i ≠ j = 1,...,n 
indicate the extent to which market shares explain observed diversion ratios. If market 
shares are good predictors, the Iji’s should come close to one. Figure 2 displays these ratios 
in increasing order and shows large deviations from unity; the ratio varies from 0.02 to 
3.54, with 21 observations smaller than 0.5, 22 between 0.5 and 1.5, and 13 above 1.5. 
 
[Figure 2: Observed diversion ratio divided by inferred diversion ratio] 
 
The observed diversion ratios differ quite substantially from what is obtained from 
market shares.10 Beyond any doubt there are considerable differences between customers’ 
first choice as represented by market shares and their (contingent) second choice as 
indicated by observed diversion ratios. Since the responses described in Table 1 seem to 
corroborate the observed diversion ratios, we reject the explanation that respondents’ 
answers are random or systematically biased.11  
In order to identify explanations for these differences see Table 2. Consider 
Drageset and its geographically closest rival – Coop Prix. The Iji’s between these stores 
show that both receive much larger shares of diverted customers from each other than 
                                                 
10 A chi-square test on the differences between observed ratios and ratios inferred from market shares makes 
us reject the null hypothesis and conclude that observed and inferred diversion ratios are not equal.  
11 Using McFadden’s choice model, see McFadden (1974), it can be shown that respondent characteristics 
explain second choice at least as well as their first choice. This is no surprise, since we expect that consumer 
characteristics explain the ordering of first and second choices. 
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implied by their market shares. This suggests that location can be important for determining 
diversion ratios.12  
 
[Table 2: Observed diversion ratio divided by inferred diversion ratio] 
 
Consider now stores located at the centre of Voss, in particular Coop Mega, and 
look at the corresponding row. Three out of four of the reported Iji’s in Table 2 are above 2, 
showing that diversions into Coop Mega (from stores in the centre, see Figure 1) are much 
higher than implied by its market share. Except for Spar, these high numbers do not 
correspond to equally high numbers from Coop Mega to the other stores. This pattern is 
consistent with the notion of a store’s product. As already noted, Coop Mega, Meny, and 
Drageset are judged by their customers to have a broad product range. The remaining stores 
focus on low price, with Spar in between. Thus, there are two reasons why for example 
diversion ratios between Coop Mega and Spar are high (Iji’s about 2.5). Customers consider 
their product ranges as reasonably equal, and the two stores are next neighbors. This 
illustrates that store characteristics can partly mitigate the differentiation caused by location, 
since similarity in two store’s product range can make those stores close substitutes even if 
they are not located close to each other. 
A third dimension to differentiation is probably also present in the data. Coop Mega 
has a much larger diversion to the low-price store Coop Prix outside the centre (indicator 
1.62) than to low price stores Rimi and Kiwi Vangen at the centre (indicators of about 0.5). 
                                                 
12 We have run a linear regression which confirms that distance matters for the diversion ratio even controlling 
for market shares. The observed revenue weighted diversion ratio is the dependent variable. We recognize that 
the customers are different and therefore include dummies for the stores from which the customers potentially 
would leave, market share of the store that the customers would potentially divert to, and distance between the 
first and second choice stores. The coefficient of distance is approximately 0.03 (and statistically significant). 
It indicates that an increased distance of 1 km would induce a 3 %-age point reduction in the diversion ratio. 
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Coop’s membership policy whereby customers get a discount on yearly spending in all 
Coop stores, i.e., a lock-in effect, is a plausible explanation.  
The I-indicators show that the main rivals to the acquired store are the Coop-stores, 
and that observed diversion to the other four NG-stores is lower than predicted by market 
shares. Hence we would expect a merger simulation based upon observed diversion ratios to 
predict a lower price increase than a simulation based upon market shares.  
 
3. Model calibration  
We construct a simulation model where demand is calibrated from observed diversion ratios 
in the Voss grocery market. (For details, see Appendix B). 
 Step 1: Observed diversion ratios are not proportional to market shares. This is taken 
as given, and the novelty of our approach is that we let own and cross price elasticities be 
determined by the observed diversion ratios. One can think of the n(n-1) diversion ratios as 
determining the corresponding cross-price elasticities.  By stipulating n market price 
elasticities εi, we are able to calibrate the n own-price elasticities (εii).  
It is useful to compare this approach to the established one in Werden and Froeb 
(1994) and Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002), where diversion ratios are assumed to be 
proportional to market shares. In addition to observed prices and volumes (market shares) 
these functions are calibrated with the stipulation of the market price elasticity and one 
measure of the partial price elasticities. 
The value of the market price elasticity may be obtained from econometric 
estimation or other sources. Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002) suggest stipulating the market 
price elasticity at -1 when nothing else is known. This is what we have done, i.e., stipulated 
εi = -1.  
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Step 2: It is well known that the price increase from a merger simulation depends on 
the chosen demand function, and that linear demand will predict a lower price increase than 
other functions that are typically used.13 In order to have conservative estimates of the price 
increase and difference in predictions from the two models we use linear demand  
 
 (1) xi = ai + Σj bij pj,   i = 1,…, n, 
 
where xi is demand for product i, ai and bij are parameters14 to be calibrated from the partial 
price elasticities, reference prices Pi = 1,15 and volumes Xi.16  
 Step 3: The marginal costs are inferred from the first-order conditions for optimal 
pricing in a Bertrand price-setting oligopoly. We assume constant variable cost (ci) and 
fixed cost (Fi) and distinguish between one-store and multi-store companies. For a one-store 
company the marginal cost is computed as: 
 
(2) ci = Pi(1+1/εii). 
 
The marginal cost is a function of the stipulated reference price and the calibrated own-
price elasticity of the product, and it is consistent with the assumptions of Bertrand behavior 
and that data constitute equilibrium. The marginal costs for a firm controlling g stores are 
                                                 
13 Crooke et al. (1999) demonstrated the very diverse predictions for post merger price increases following the 
choice of linear, logit, AIDS, or isoelastic demand functions.  
14 From εij ≡ (∂xi /∂pj)(pj/xi) = bij(pj /xi), we find bij = εij(Xj /Pi) and next ai = Xi – Σj bij Pj = Xi(1-εi).  
15 We argued above that some stores focus on low price implying that others have higher prices. This might be 
reflected in different reference prices. First, these differences are small, probably less than 10%. Next, the 
calibration of marginal costs from first order conditions reflects price levels whereby the marginal cost 
transmits reference price level into the equilibrium price level. Stipulating Pi = 1 also makes the revenue based 
diversion ratios from the enquiry immediately available as volume indicators. 
16 Lower-case symbols (x and p) denote variables in the model, while upper-case X and P denote levels that 
are observed or taken as references.  
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found by solving g linear equations in g unknown marginal costs ci.17 Table 3 displays the 
calibrated marginal costs corresponding to each demand system - one based upon observed 
diversion ratios (OBS), the other based upon diversion ratios assumed to be proportional to 
market shares (MS). 
 
[Table 3: Calibrated marginal cost and own price elasticities of stores] 
 
The calibrated marginal costs (ci) of the MS model show little variation. The two 
one-store companies are imputed the highest costs; the stores of the two-store company 
slightly lower costs, while the stores of the four-store group get the lowest cost. Differences 
on company level stem from the coordination of pricing within companies. The cost 
variations between stores within a company or between the two one-store companies stem 
from their sizes (sales revenue); the larger the sales, the lower the imputed marginal cost c.  
The calibrated marginal costs (ci) of the OBS model differ considerably more across 
stores than the corresponding numbers for the MS model. This follows from the larger 
differences in calibrated partial price elasticities (compare Tables A1 (a) and (b)), which 
again reflects differences in diversion ratios between these models. In the MS model, 
diversion ratios in a row are of similar values and calibrated own-price elasticities become 
roughly equal. Observed diversion ratios, however, convey large asymmetries, whereby 
calibrated own-price elasticities in the OBS model show larger variation. 
 
                                                 
17 We have included diversion ratios between the four stores owned by NG prior to the merger, because these 
stores can be substitutes for the consumers. Obviously, NG will internalize diversion between its stores, for 
example by identical price increases. This price-increasing mechanism is taken care of in the calibration of 
marginal costs, since it is assumed that NG set prices jointly in all its stores. The higher the diversion ratios 
between the stores in the NG group, the larger are the price-cost margins that NG can set and the larger are the 
calibrated price-cost margin for the NG stores prior to the merger.  
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4. The price effects of a merger 
As usual we assume that cost structures are unchanged from before the acquisition. Also, 
we only consider the computation of unilateral effects by merging parties and the 
immediate response from rivals. In an actual merger case, some of the parties may 
subsequently invest in promotion, product revision, etc.  Modifications along these lines can 
be incorporated in our approach as in other models.  Such extensions would require 
additional and case-specific information, they may be based on speculative, or at least, less 
quantifiable and directly measurable effects and they are disregarded here. Alternatively, 
the merger simulations should be focusing on the price effect alone and be supplemented by 
a more qualitative analysis such as the prospects for entry and any possible reposition of 
products after the merger.  
 The magnitude of price increases following a merger depends upon the behavior of 
the most price sensitive customers. In our survey all customers – not only the marginal ones 
– are asked about their second choice. Since diversion ratios may differ between customers, 
this may create a bias. However, we do not think there will be any systematic bias. All 
customers have a second choice, and we see no obvious reason why a price sensitive 
customer’s second choice is more likely to be, say, store number one than what is 
represented by this store’s diversion ratio in the sample as a whole. Therefore, we have no a 
priori reason to believe that the observed diversion ratios of the whole sample understate or 
overstate the diversion ratios of the marginal consumers.18 
 
 
                                                 
18 This conclusion is supported by results reported in Bordley (1985) and further discussed in Bordley (1993). 
He finds that under certain conditions – that are met for a large class of demand functions – the diversion ratio 
is independent of the amount of the price change. This differs from what we expect to find for price 
elasticities. The marginal customer is by definition more price sensitive, and an average measure would imply 
that we would underestimate the price sensitivity following a marginal price increase. For further discussion, 
see Appendix D in Competition Commission’s investigation of Somerfield plc/Wm Morrisson Supermarket 
plc in 2005. 
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4.1 Merger simulation 
The post merger model consists of the same equations as the pre-merger model, with the 
same calibrated demand and cost parameters, with one exception. The acquired firm, 
Drageset, is not an individual store, but part of the acquiring company. 
 
[Table 4: Predicted %-age price increases following the acquisition] 
 
 There are similarities in predictions from these two models. First, in both models 
prices increase more for the stores involved in the acquisition (Meny, Spar, Kiwi Vangen 
and Kiwi Palmafossen together with the acquired store Drageset) than for outside stores. 
This is line with theory, see Deneckere and Davidson (1985). A merger implies that the 
merging parties no longer compete against each other. Rather they coordinate their behavior 
by setting higher prices on all their products. The outsiders, on the other hand, have at the 
outset no reason to change their price setting. They only respond to the price increases by 
the merging parties and increase both their prices and volumes. Second, the price increase 
of the acquired store Drageset is predicted to be the highest in both models. To understand 
this, note that even though it has the second largest market share (less than 20 %), it is small 
compared to the sum of the other four stores involved in the acquisition (with a combined 
market share of more than 40 %). About 39 % of Drageset’s customers have one of the four 
stores as their second choice, while 23 % of the customers at these stores have Drageset as 
their second choice. The large diversion from Drageset to the other four parties implies that 
it is optimal to increase its price substantially after the acquisition. The other stores have 
internalized diversions between themselves before the acquisition and the additional 
internalization of diversion is low warranting only a smaller increase. 
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 Despite some similarities, there are also important differences in predictions from 
these two models. First, the predicted average price increase of model OBS is 40 % lower 
than that of model MS. By comparing market shares and diversion ratios, we can explain 
(some of) the difference. The observed diversion from Drageset to the four stores involved 
in the acquisition is 39 %, while the corresponding diversion inferred from market shares is 
54 %. Thus, the MS model overestimates the extent to which the acquisition internalizes 
diversion. The MS model considers Drageset to be a closer rival to the other merging stores 
than what follows from the observed diversion ratios. Drageset’s main rival, Coop Prix, is 
not involved in the acquisition. There are large diversion ratios between Drageset and Coop 
Prix, the two stores that are located close to each other, and they compete fiercely also after 
the acquisition. Competition is thus considered as more intense in the OBS model and 
implies a stronger competitive constraint on the price setting after the acquisition. Second, 
the between-store variation in predicted price increases is much larger in model OBS than 
in model MS. This feature is similar to what was observed above with respect to calibrated 
marginal costs. Model OBS simply contains more diverse data (asymmetries) than does 
model MS.19 
The very diverse marginal costs that were inferred for the OBS-model may be 
interpreted as invalidating our approach by signaling that there is some inconsistency in 
data and assumptions behind eq. (2).20 Given our confidence in the observed diversion 
ratios and the calibrated demand, an alternative approach to establishing the model is to 
stipulate marginal costs. Assume we choose ci = 0.75 for all i, which is about the average of 
                                                 
19 In order to facilitate the comparison of price predictions from the two demand systems and focus on the 
consequences of the diversion ratios between the stores, we have used the observed diversions out of the 
market in both models. We have rerun the models with the alternative assumption that the diversion out of the 
market is equal (to the average 18.7 %) for all stores. It turns out that the predicted price increases are hardly 
affected by this change of assumption. 
20 The drawback of calibrating the marginal costs residually is that all deficiencies in data or assumptions are 
transmitted into the calibrated marginal costs. See Werden and Froeb (2008) for a discussion of the method. 
Given our goal to compare two models that differ with respect to how demand is derived these drawbacks 
should not discriminate or favor any of the two approaches.  
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marginal costs for both models.21 The price increases predicted from this version of the 
models are 2.6% for OBS and 5.1% for the MS-model. These numbers are not very 
different from those obtained above, 3.2% and 5.3% (OBS and MS, respectively). Thus, the 
difference between predictions remains.22 
 As a last robustness check of our calibration we varied the prices for the various 
stores according to observations of the prices in various chains’ stores. The stores were put 
into three categories with prices 5% respectively 10% above the lowest. What we found 
was that when the price level of a store is increased, its imputed marginal cost is increased 
by the same amount, which is also seen from eq. (2) (for a one-store company). Thus, the 
resulting price increase from a merger was lowered compared to the base case. 
  
4.2 The effects of partial information on diversion ratios  
In other cases one might have some, but not a complete set of the diversion ratios. 
Moreover, because it is costly to obtain this information, one might wonder whether it will 
pay in terms of improved predictions to acquire (more) diversion ratios. In order to illustrate 
the potential value of more information, consider a sequence of simulations where we 
initially use model (MS) that is based only on market shares and iteratively revise it by 
employing increasingly more information in terms of observed diversion ratios.  
 Theory says that diversion ratios between the merging parties are the most important 
factors for explaining price increases. This is explained in Farrell and Shapiro (2010), and 
                                                 
21 We now dispense with the idea that observed prices (Pi = 1) constitute equilibrium. Rather we calibrate pre-
acquisition equilibrium prices that in general will differ from 1.0. Next, we compute post-merger prices and 
then derive price changes. 
22 We have also looked into the effect of using other values than -1 for the market price elasticity. When the 
external elasticity is halved, the predictions of price-increases in both models are doubled. This should not 
come as a surprise looking at the relationship between the external elasticity and the partial price elasticities in 
(A5) in the appendix. Doubling εi means doubling all partial elasticities as well, and thus doubling the own 
price elasticity εii. Conversely, a doubling of the external elasticity leads to predicted price-increases that are 
halved compared to the base case. 
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also pointed out in the US horizontal merger guidelines.23  Consider therefore first a 
modified MS model where diversions from the acquired store are replaced by the 
corresponding observed numbers. The predicted price increase of this model is lower than 
that of the modified MS model and explains 46 % of the difference in average price 
predictions between two models.24 Introducing next observed diversion ratios for one of the 
four stores already controlled by the acquiring chain reduces the gap between model 
predictions by another 20 %. Including observed diversion ratios of only these two stores 
contributes 2/3 of the difference in prediction from a full set of observed diversion ratios 
versus no such data (Figure 3), suggesting that just a subset of the (actual) diversion ratios 
may contribute significantly to improve the prediction from a merger simulation.  
 
[Figure 3: Average price increases from subsets of observed diversion ratios] 
 
Shapiro (1996, 2007) advocates a totally different approach basing price prediction 
on simple formulas assuming the industry is described by a single-product duopoly. He 
suggests using such a formula to screen mergers.25 Competition Commission applied his 
formula to predict what they called ‘illustrative price increases’ following Somerfield’s 
acquisition of Morrison’s 115 grocery stores in 2005.26 In the Voss case a multi-store 
company acquires another store.27 Although a simple formula may not suit this more 
                                                 
23 In US (2010) it is stated that ‘diversion ratios between [merging firms’ products] can be very informative 
for assessing unilateral price effects. … Diversion ratios between products sold by merging .. and non-
merging firms have at most secondary predictive value.’ 
24 This is explained by the observed diversion ratios. Table 2 shows that all diversion ratios from Drageset to 
NG stores are lower than those that are estimated from market shares. 
25 Farrell and Shapiro (2010) have proposed an alternative way to screen mergers. They do not estimate any 
price increase following a merger, but rather ask whether a merger will lead to an upward pricing pressure 
(UPP). This will be the case if the UPP from loss of direct competition is not offset by a reduction in marginal 
costs. Their approach has been criticized in Schmalensee (2010), who proposes to use simple merger 
simulations instead of an UPP approach. 
26 For a critique of their price predictions, see RBB (2006). 
27 Moresi et al. (2008) discuss how the existence of multiproduct firms will affect the definition of the relevant 
market. However, they do not provide any simple formula for the price increase following a merger in such a 
market. 
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complex situation it is of interest to illustrate the approach. When only the price of one of 
the two products is increased, the increase is mD/2, where m is the price-cost margin and D 
is the diversion from this product to the other. Filling in our numbers, the acquired firm 
would increase its price by 5.7 % according to this simplified Shapiro approach.28 In 
comparison, model OBS predicts a price increase of 7.5 % (Table 4) and model MS predicts 
an even larger increase of 11.4 %. One obvious reason for the difference in predictions 
between a simple formula and a simulation model is that the models (OBS and MS) allow 
prices on all products to be increased (adjusted). Anticipating such adjustments, it becomes 
profitable to increase the price of the one product even more. 
 
5. Some concluding remarks 
We have presented an example from a local market where customers’ stated diversion ratios 
(their second choice) differ considerably from diversion ratios that are proportional to 
market shares (customers’ first choice). This case shows that market shares can be poor 
predictors for the actual competition between products, and it is not surprising that the price 
predictions from the simulation based upon observed diversion ratios differ significantly 
from predictions of the simulation based only on market shares. It illustrates that the 
traditional approach to merger investigation – by considering market shares – can be 
misleading.  
 As far as we know, no other merger simulation model is based upon observed 
diversion ratios. Our approach can be valuable where diversion ratios are easily obtained. 
Even information on some, but not all ratios can significantly improve the price predictions. 
Information on diversion ratios between some or all of the merging parties would provide a 
quick and easy extension of the existing, calibrated merger simulation models. 
                                                 
28 The diversion ratio from the acquired store to the other stores involved in the merger is 38.7 %, and we 
apply the price-cost margin (1 - 0.705) which was used in model OBS (see Table 3). 
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 We have found that in this particular case a model based on market shares would 
predict a higher price increase than a model based on diversion ratios. One reason could be 
the way the local market has been selected for investigation by competition authorities. The 
actual acquisition involved several local markets, and the one we have investigated is the 
one which the competition authority selected because it had the highest market shares of the 
firms involved in the acquisition. Such a screening can lead to a systematic bias, since the 
mergers with large market shares by the involved parties are not the necessarily the ones 
with high diversion ratios among those parties. In other instances, the market share 
approach may underestimate the anticompetitive problem. A merger would have the largest 
anticompetitive effect if two firms with high diversion ratios between their products merge. 
Firms behaving strategically might find it profitable to merge two units with relatively low 
market shares, but high diversion ratios between their products. The low market shares may 
result in an early clearance by competition authorities, while the merger internalizes intense 
competition due to high diversion ratios between their products.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics from the survey 
  Average Price Product Residence Leakage 
  bill (NOK)   range at Voss out of Voss
       
Rimi (ICA)  183.05 22.8 8.9 92.1 11.9 
Drageset (the acquired store) 428.56 1.0 29.3 77.8 10.1 
Coop Mega  299.96 4.1 34.0 87.6 17.5 
Coop Prix 254.06 20.8 0.0 91.7 17.7 
Meny (Norgesgruppen)  443.55 0.0 37.8 76.5 20.4 
Spar (Norgesgruppen)  221.44 2.0 13.1 84.9 14.1 
Kiwi Vangen (Norgesgruppen) 154.84 28.6 2.0 89.8 17.4 
Kiwi Palmafossen (Norgesgruppen) 280.83 17.0 2.2 94.3 14.8 
       
       
Notes: The names in parentheses indicate the retail chain of the various stores.  
 Average bill denotes average bill per respondent (1 NOK ≈  1/9 Euro) 
 Price denotes the share of the respondents saying price is important for their choice 
 Product range denotes the share of the respondents saying product range is 
 important for their choice 
 Residence at Voss is the share of the respondents being a Voss resident. 
 Leakage out of Voss denotes the share of the respondents saying that their 2nd 
 choice is not among one of the eight surveyed stores 
 
 
Table 2.   The relative diversion ratios: Iij = dij/Dij   j ≠ i. 
 
From     Coop Coop     Kiwi Kiwi 
To Rimi Drageset Mega Prix Meny Spar Vangen Palmaf.
         
Rimi  0.36 0.53 0.34 0.46 0.25 1.65 1.59
Drageset 0.14 0.15 2.83 0.89 0.24 0.02 0.22
Coop Mega 2.18 1.21 0.96 2.19 2.48 1.40 0.82
Coop Prix 0.94 3.54 1.62 0.32 0.29 0.12 0.38
Meny 0.92 0.97 1.14 0.49 1.01 0.26 1.78
Spar 0.48 0.53 2.66 0.31 0.82  2.00 0.70
Kiwi Vangen 1.13 0.33 0.49 0.52 0.09 1.84 1.17
Kiwi Palmafossen 1.66 0.61 0.22 0.89 1.33 0.62 2.80
         
 
Notes: dji denotes observed diversion ratios, while Dji denotes a diversion ratio that is 
proportional to firm j’s market share. 
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Table 3: Calibrated marginal cost and own price elasticities of stores 
 
      
 Own price elasticity  Marginal cost 
 OBS MS OBS MS 
      
Rimi -3.65 -5.63 0.726 0.823 
Drageset -3.39 -5.19 0.705 0.807 
Coop Mega -7.73 -5.44 0.852 0.804 
Coop Prix -5.89 -5.80 0.812 0.802 
Meny -4.81 -5.07 0.722 0.725 
Spar -5.98 -5.43 0.696 0.708 
Kiwi Vangen -4.26 -5.75 0.594 0.707 
Kiwi Palmafossen -5.14 -5.70  0.642 0.711 
      
 
 
Notes: OBS denotes that numbers come from the model based on observed diversion ratios, 
while MS denotes that numbers come from the model where diversion ratios are 
proportional to firms’ market shares. Pre merger prices are set equal to 1, such that 
price-cost margins are equal to (1 – marginal cost). 
 
 
Table 4. Predicted percentage price increases following the acquisition 
 
  OBS MS 
    
Rimi  1.1 2.7 
Drageset  7.5 11.3 
Coop Mega  1.6 2.7 
Coop Prix  1.9 2.6 
Meny  4.1 5.7 
Spar  2.5 6.2 
Kiwi Vangen  1.8 6.3 
Kiwi Palmafossen  2.9 6.1 
    
Average  3.2 5.3 
 
 
Note: See note to Table 3. 
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Figure 1: Grocery stores at Voss 
 
 
 
Note:  The four stores owned by the retail chain Norgesgruppen are marked with a black 
square; the two Coop stores are marked with a black triangle; Drageset, acquired by 
Norgesgruppen, is marked with a circle, and Rimi, a store in the retail chain ICA is 
marked with a star. The five stores clustered in the centre of Voss are – counted 
from west to east - Kiwi Vangen, Spar, Coop Mega, Rimi, and Meny. Drageset and 
Coop Prix are located about four km to the north of the centre, while Kiwi 
Palmafossen is located about two km to the east. 
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Figure 2: Observed diversion ratio divided by diversion ratio from market shares. 
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Figure 3. Predicted average price increase given subsets of observed diversion ratios. 
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Notes: MS denotes the prediction of the MS model. Drageset denotes the prediction of a 
modified MS model where we use the observed diversion ratios from Drageset, that 
is, this column of diversion ratios is changed. Similarly, Spar shows the prediction 
of a modified MS-model where also the observed diversion ratios from Spar are 
used. OBS denotes the prediction if we use the observed diversion ratios between all 
eight stores. 
Iji = dji/ ji 
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Appendix A.  
 
 
Table A1 (a). Partial price elasticities at benchmark values – the OBS model.  
         
         
From     Coop Coop     Kiwi Kiwi 
To Rimi Drageset Mega Prix Meny Spar Vangen Palma.
         
Rimi -3.65 0.22 0.53 0.12 0.47 0.19 0.48 0.63
Drageset 0.05 -3.39 0.15 1.00 0.91 0.18 0.01 0.09
Coop Mega 0.72 0.75 -7.73 0.34 2.23 1.94 0.41 0.33
Coop Prix 0.31 2.20 1.63 -5.89 0.33 0.22 0.04 0.15
Meny 0.31 0.61 1.15 0.17 -4.81 0.79 0.08 0.71
Spar 0.16 0.33 2.68 0.11 0.84 -5.98 0.59 0.28
Kiwi Vangen 0.37 0.20 0.49 0.18 0.09 1.44 -4.26 0.47
Kiwi Palmafossen 0.55 0.38 0.22 0.32 1.36 0.49 0.82 -5.14
         
         
 
 
         
         
Table A1 (b). Partial price elasticities at benchmark values – the MS model.  
         
         
From     Coop Coop     Kiwi Kiwi 
To Rimi Drageset Mega Prix Meny Spar Vangen Palma.
         
Rimi -5.63 0.95 0.71 0.35 1.07 0.71 0.40 0.44
Drageset 0.51 -5.19 0.71 0.35 1.07 0.71 0.40 0.44
Coop Mega 0.51 0.95 -5.44 0.35 1.07 0.71 0.40 0.44
Coop Prix 0.51 0.95 0.71 -5.80 1.07 0.71 0.40 0.44
Meny 0.51 0.95 0.71 0.35 -5.07 0.71 0.40 0.44
Spar 0.51 0.95 0.71 0.35 1.07 -5.43 0.40 0.44
Kiwi Vangen 0.51 0.95 0.71 0.35 1.07 0.71 -5.75 0.44
Kiwi Palmafossen 0.51 0.95 0.71 0.35 1.07 0.71 0.40 -5.70
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Appendix B. Model calibration 
There are three steps in our calibration of demand. First, the full set of partial price elasticities 
are derived from diversion ratios and assumed market price elasticities. 29 This step is general 
and holds for any demand system. Next, a choice of functional form is made, and finally, 
parameters of this functional form are derived from the partial price elasticities.  
 
1. A routine for calibrating partial price elasticities from diversion ratios 
Assume there are n differentiated products (stores in our application), and let xi and pi 
denote volume respectively price of product i. Demand for product i is  
 
 (A1) xi = fi(p1,…, pn),   i = 1,…,n, 
 
The diversion ratio says which fraction of diverted customers from product i that switch to 
product j because of a price increase of product i 
 
(A2) dji ≡ (∂xj/∂pi)/(∂xi/∂pi) = εji xj /εii xi,  i ≠ j = 1,...,n.30     
 
The diversion ratio says nothing about how many customers or what fraction of product i’s 
customer base will leave. The own-price elasticity contains such information. Eq. (A2) 
suggests that given the values of εii, i=1,…,n, all cross-price elasticities εji can be derived.  
 
(A3) εji = dji(xi/xj)εii,     j ≠ i =1,…,n   or equivalently    εij = dij(xj/xi)εjj,   i ≠ j =1,…,n.    
 
A demand system for n imperfect substitutes in n prices has n2 partial price elasticities. 
Often one has insufficient data to pin down that many parameters. Our observed diversion 
ratios indicate non-symmetric differentiation, which we take as given. One can think of the 
n(n-1) diversion ratios as determining the corresponding cross-price elasticities as shown in 
                                                 
29 Observing that all partial price elasticities may be derived from own-price elasticities and diversion ratios 
(fractions), Bordley (1993) suggests estimating price elasticities of demand by first estimating diversion 
fractions. We take observed diversion ratios as given and derive demand that is consistent with these 
observations. While all our price elasticities have the right signs, they will typically not satisfy conditions of 
individual consumer demand theory, as imposed by Bordley.  
30 The partial price elasticity εij ≡ (∂xi/∂pj)(pj/xi) is called own-price elasticity when j=i and cross-price elasticity 
when j≠i. 
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eq. (A3). Next we stipulate the n market price elasticities (εi), whereafter the n own-price 
elasticities (εii) are determined from the following relationship between price elasticities31  
 
(A4) εi  = εii + Σj≠i  εij,   i = 1,…,n.   
 
To demonstrate this routine, set  dii = 1 and use eq. (A3) to substitute for cross-price 
elasticities in eq. (A4)  
 
 εi   =  εii + Σ j≠i εij = dii(xi/xi)εii + Σ j≠i dij(xj/xi)εjj =  Σ j dij(xj/xi)εjj   i = 1,…,n. 
 
Assume that in addition to diversion ratios dji and stipulated market price elasticities εi, we 
have observed quantities (Xi). Substitute Xi for xi and multiply by Xi to obtain 
 
(A5) Xiεi = Σj (dijXj)εjj, i = 1,…,n.     
 
(A5) is a set of n linear equations that is solved in order to obtain n own-price elasticities εjj. 
Define vi = Xiεi  and rij = dijXj. On vector notation eq. (A5) is v = Rχ, where the vector v and 
the matrix R represent data (observations and stipulations/best guesses) and χ is a vector of 
unknown variables representing own-price elasticities (the scales of diversion). In order to 
solve for χ the matrix R has to be non-singular, and furthermore, for the solution values to 
have the right sign, i.e., εjj = χj < 0, R-1 should to be positive. Both these requirements follow 
from the assumption that Σi≠ j |dij | < 1, j=1,...n. Then R-1 > 0 and χ = R-1v < 0.  
The critical assumption is that there is diversion out of the market, that is, some 
customers at store j would rather buy outside the market than from any of the n-1 other stores 
in this market. With dii = 1 each column of R has a positive sum of elements, which implies a 
positive dominant diagonal. With negative off-diagonal elements, R-1 is then non-negative, 
and because vj < 0, εjj = χj < 0, i.e., own-price elasticities are negative. From eq. (A3) we now 
obtain all cross-price elasticities, which are positive. 
                                                 
31 Let pj = Pjt,  j=1,…,n, with Pj reference price and t a price change. The market price elasticity is defined as εi ≡ 
(dxi/dt)(t/xi). Totally differentiating demand, fi(p1(t),..., pn(t)), we obtain dxi/dt = Σj (∂xi/∂pj)(∂pj/∂t). Multiplying 
through the equation by (t/xi) gives us the market elasticity on the left, whereas the right hand side can be written 
as the sum of products of two elasticities, εi = Σj εij εjt, and since εjt ≡ (∂pj/∂t)(t/pj) = Pj(t/Pjt) = 1 for all j, it 
follows that εi  = Σj εij. 
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It is useful to compare our approach to the established one as exemplified by the ALM 
model of Werden and Froeb (1994) and the PCAIDS model of Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002). 
Each of them employs a functional form that implies that diversion ratios are proportional to 
market shares.32, 33 Together with observed prices and volumes (or market shares) these 
functions are calibrated with the stipulation of only two parameters related to price elasticity 
of demand. In both the ALM and the PCAIDS model the average market price elasticity (ε) is 
stipulated.34 In addition, Werden and Froeb (op. cit.) stipulate a parameter β representing the 
scale of partial elasticities, while Epstein and Rubinfeld (op. cit.) stipulate one of the n own-
price elasticities. All (remaining) partial price elasticities then follow from the functional 
form, the observed prices and volumes, and these two stipulated parameters.  
 Before closing this section observe the following implication of eq. (A5). 35 
 
(A6) Σi siεi = Σj sjεjjd0j   
 
The average market price elasticity (ε) on the left equals an average product of own-price 
elasticity and diversion out of the market. In their ALM model Werden and Froeb (1994) 
define the market elasticity ε ≡βP0p* where β is a parameter representing the level of partial 
price elasticities, P0 is the fraction of customer that buys outside the market, and p* is the 
average price level. Thus, when both the values for ε and β are stipulated, and p* follows 
from data, P0 is determined. In our case the d0j’s (diversion out of the market) are observed, 
whereby we need to stipulate only one of the two prices sensitivities ε  or β. A relevant 
question is which of these parameters we do have most confidence in. Our OBS method is 
based on an enquiry into diversion ratios, including responses on buying outside the market. 
Of the two elasticities we think that the market price elasticity is an easier number to intuit 
than own-price elasticities. 
                                                 
32 Both systems allow for hierarchical decomposition (or nesting) such that clusters of products can be handled; 
products within a nest are equally close substitutes and each of them is an equally close substitute to any product 
in another nest. Nesting improves the fit to underlying non-symmetry, but suffers from treating products as either 
in a particular nest or not, while often there is gradual change in location.  
33 Proportionality is a manifestation of the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and is a 
useful definition of what it means that products are equally close substitutes to each other. As an illustration, 
consider firms A, B, and C with market shares 0.5, 0.3, respectively 0.2. Based on these shares the diversion 
ratio from A to B is 0.3/(1-0.5) = 0.6 and from A to C is 0.2/(1-0.5) = 0.4. Hausman et al. (1994) point out that 
IIA is often rejected in empirical analyses.  
34 In PCAIDS all εi = ε, while in ALM ε = Σi si εi, where si is market share of product i.  
35 Let si ≡ Xi /Σj Xj. Summing over i in eq. (A5), the left hand side is immediate. On the right hand side switch 
summation order and observe that Σi dij = 1 - Σi≠ j |dij | ≡ d0j, which is diversion out of the market. 
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In the Voss case we stipulate market elasticities εi = -1, i=1,…,8.36 The derived own 
price elasticities (from eq. (A5)) and the cross-price elasticities (from eq. (A3)) are reported in 
Table A1 (a). The row-sums are -1 as assumed (cf. eq. A4.) Table A1 (b) shows the partial 
price elasticities that follow from proportionality with market shares. Also in this matrix are 
the row-sums -1. Furthermore, cross price elasticities of row i are proportional to market 
shares, and cross price elasticities in a column are identical. These features are shared with the 
PCAIDS and ALM models and follow from the assumption of proportionality.  
 
2. Calibration of demand for the Voss case 
In order to have a conservative estimate of the price increase we use linear demand  
 
 xi = ai + Σj bij pj,   i = 1,…,8, 
 
where ai and bij are parameters to be calibrated from the full set of partial price elasticities.37  
We define reference prices Pi = 1 and volumes to equal observed market shares Xi = si. 
 
3. Calibration of marginal cost 
We follow the established approach to calibration of marginal costs by inferring these from 
the first-order conditions for optimal pricing. We assume constant variable cost (ci) and fixed 
cost (Fi). As there are both one-store companies and multi-store companies we have to 
distinguish between these types. The one-store company profit is given by Πi = (pi – ci)xi – Fi, 
and the first order condition is: 
 
(A7) ∂Πi /∂pi = xi + (pi – ci) (∂xi /∂pi) = xi + (pi – ci)bii = 0.  
 
Using eq. (A7), observed values of xi and pi (Xi respectively Pi) and the calibrated value of bii, 
the (assumed constant) marginal cost is computed as 
 
 (A8) ci = (Xi + bii Pi)/bii = Xi/bii + Pi. 
 
                                                 
36 Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002) suggest that absent independent information, εi = -1 is a good starting point for a 
preliminary merger simulation.  
37 From εij ≡ (∂xi /∂pj)(pj/xi) = bij(pj /xi), we find bij = εij(Xj /Pi) and next ai = Xi – Σj bij Pj = Xi(1-εi). 
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A multi-store company controls a group (G) of g stores. Profit is ∑ ⊂ −−=∏ Gj GjjjG Fx)cp(  
and the first order condition   
 
 (A9) ( ) 0,  jG i j jj G
i i
x
x p c i G
p p⊂
∂∂∏ = + − = ∈∂ ∂∑ . 
 
Using observed values we get 
 
(A10) ( ) 0,i j j jij GX P c b i G⊂+ − = ∈∑ . 
 
These are g linear equations in g unknown marginal costs ci, whose values are obtained by 
matrix inversion.  
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